

JOEL S. HELLMAN

Walsh School of Foreign Service
301 Intercultural Center
Washington, DC 200157

Tel: +1 (202) 687 0468
Cell: +1 (202) 817 5128
Email: jhellman@georgetown.edu

EDUCATION

Columbia University	Ph.D. in Political Science (with Distinction) , June 1993
Columbia University	M.Phil. in Political Science , September 1990
University of Oxford	M.Phil. in Russian and East European Studies , St. Antony's College and Exeter College, June 1986
Williams College	B.A. in Area Studies (with Highest Honors) , June 1984

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

Georgetown University Washington DC July '15-	Dean and Distinguished Professor of Practice, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service ➤ <i>Leads one of the oldest and most distinguished international affairs schools in the world with 1400 undergraduates, 8 masters degree programs, 23 academic institutes and centers, and an alumni network of more than 30,000 across the globe.</i>
World Bank Governance Global Practice Washington, DC July '14 – July '15	Chief Institutional Economist ➤ <i>Led the World Bank's global research, knowledge and learning agenda on governance, institutional reform and political economy.</i> ➤ <i>Managed a portfolio of over 500 ongoing research studies, technical assistance programs and knowledge products in 90 client countries.</i> ➤ <i>Designed and implemented a training curriculum on governance reform for over 900 Global Practice staff.</i>
World Bank Operations Policy & Country Services Nairobi, Kenya July '11 – June '14	Director, Fragile and Conflict Affected States Director, Global Hub on Conflict, Security and Development ➤ <i>Led the World Bank's global practice on fragile and conflict affected states, with responsibility for country strategy and support, operations policy, human resources policy, financing, knowledge and research, and partnerships.</i> ➤ <i>Core team member leading global fund-raising efforts for the record setting \$52 billion replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) concessional finance window including highest ever</i>

HELLMAN/Curriculum Vitae, page 2

	<p>\$3 billion increase in funds for fragile and conflict affected states.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Led fund-raising and operations for the \$500 million State and Peace-Building Fund, the World Bank's largest thematic trust fund to support operations to prevent conflict and strengthen state institutions in fragile situations. ➤ Created a new Nairobi-based operations hub to provide direct implementation support and strategic advice on conflict, security and development to World Bank teams in over 40 fragile and conflict affected states and regions. ➤ Represented the World Bank on the United Nations Senior Peace-building Group.
<p>World Bank South Asia Region New Delhi, India March '08 – June '11</p>	<p>Manager, Governance and Public Sector Group</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Created a new decentralized department of governance and public sector specialists across the 8 countries of South Asia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. ➤ Developed and managed a large portfolio of lending operations, technical assistance, and research to strengthen accountability, transparency, and public sector performance with a strong emphasis on fragile and conflict affected states.
<p>World Bank East Asia Region Jakarta and Banda Aceh, Indonesia April '03- March '08</p>	<p>Coordinator, World Bank Tsunami Response in Aceh and Nias Governance Adviser, Indonesia Country Office</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Led the development and implementation of the World Bank's \$800 million tsunami recovery and post-conflict reintegration program in Aceh and Nias, including the 15 nation Multi-Donor Trust Fund. ➤ Led a portfolio of governance, decentralization, and public sector programs and managed government relations, country strategy, and external communications for the Indonesia Country Office. ➤ Served as Deputy Director and Acting Country Director, managing one of the World Bank's largest field offices.
<p>World Bank East Europe & Central Asia Region Washington, DC July '00-March '03</p>	<p>Lead Specialist, Governance and Public Sector Reform</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Managed a wide range of projects and research on governance and public sector reform in East Europe and the former Soviet Union with extensive field experience.
<p>European Bank for Reconstruction & Development Office of the Chief Economist London, UK May '97-June '00</p>	<p>Senior Political Counselor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Responsible for all aspects of political analysis and research, government relations, and representation in the former Soviet states. ➤ Editor of the flagship publication, <u>EBRD Transition Report</u>, and creator of the 26-nation <u>Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey</u>, the first major cross-country governance survey at the firm level.

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Harvard University <i>July '93-May '97</i>	Assistant Professor , Department of Government ➤ <i>Teaching and research at the graduate and undergraduate levels on the politics of economic reform and transitions with a special focus on post-Soviet and East European states.</i> ➤ <i>Courses taught included: The Politics of Economic Policy Reform (with Robert Bates); Building Markets and Democracy in Post-Soviet Systems; and The Comparative Politics of Post-Communism (with Timothy Colton).</i>
Columbia University <i>July '92-June '93</i>	Assistant Professor , Department of Political Science ➤ <i>Teaching and research at the graduate and undergraduate levels on the politics of economic reform and transitions with a special focus on post-Soviet and East European states.</i> ➤ <i>Courses taught included: The State and Economic Policy; The Politics of Transition; and Post-Soviet Politics.</i>

Visiting Academic Positions

- **Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study**, Budapest, Hungary, October-November 2000.
- **Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars**, Washington, DC, June-December 1996.
- **Center for Research and Graduate Education-Institute of Economics**, Prague, Czech Republic, April-June 1996.
- **Yale University, Department of Political Science**, New Haven, CT, September 1987-June 1988.

Fellowships and Honors

- Sage Prize for Best Paper in Comparative Politics (1997 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting)
- National Council for Soviet and East European Research Fellowship
- Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Research Fellowship
- Social Science Research Council Fellowship
- Andrew Carnegie Junior Fellowship
- John Moody Fellowship (Exeter College, Oxford)

PUBLICATIONS

"Governance Gone Local: Does Decentralization Improve Accountability?" (with Jose Edgardo Campos) in *East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005).

"The Inequality of Influence," (with Daniel Kaufmann) in Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., *Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Anticorruption in Transition 2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 199-2002 (with Cheryl Gray and Randi Ryterman) (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).

"Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies," (with Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann), *Journal of Comparative Economics*, vol. 31, no. 4 (December 2003).

"Russia's Transition to a Market Economy: A Permanent Redistribution?" in Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., *Russia After the Fall* (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2002).

"Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies," (with Daniel Kaufmann) *Finance and Development*, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2001).

"Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State," (with Mark Schankerman) *Economics of Transition*, vol. 8, no. 3 (2000), 545-576.

"Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies," (with Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann) *Transition* (May-June-July 2000).

"Measuring Governance, Corruption and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies," (with G. Jones, D. Kaufmann and M. Schankerman) *World Bank Policy Research Paper*, no. 2312 (April 2000).

Editor, *Transition Report 1999* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999).

"Governance in Transition," (with Mark Schankerman) in *Transition Report 1999* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999).

HELLMAN/Curriculum Vitae, page 5

Editor, *Transition Report 1998* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1998).

"Progress in Market-Oriented Transition," (with Christian Mumssen) in *Transition Report 1998* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1998).

"Review Essay: Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies," *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1998).

"Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions," *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 2 (January 1998). Awarded the Sage Prize for Best Paper in Comparative Politics (1998 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting).

"The Level and Pattern of Corruption in Transition Economies," in *Transition Report 1997* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997).

"Progress in Market-Oriented Transition," in *Transition Report 1997* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1997).

"Constitutions and Economic Reform: A Comparative Approach," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor, eds., *The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

"Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Post-communist Transitions," *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Winter 1996).

"Russia Adjusts to Stability," *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 10 (May 1996).

"Bureaucrats vs. Markets? Rethinking the Bureaucratic Response to Market Reform in Command Economies," in Susan Solomon, ed., *Beyond Sovietology: Essays in Politics and History* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

"Gorbachev's New World View," *Social Policy*, vol. 18, no.1 (Summer 1987).

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Languages: Russian (excellent), Bahasa Indonesia (good), Spanish (basic)

Born: March 1, 1963 in Brooklyn, New York. Married to Sharon Hellman with one child.

Dr. Daniel Kaufmann – *Curriculum Vitae*

President and CEO, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI, a leading think tank in extractives governance); Brookings Institution scholar; former World Bank director. Economist and policy adviser to countries and global organizations on Governance, Transparency, Regulation, Anti-Corruption, Natural Resources and Development. Expertise on Latin America, Africa, OECD, and Transition Economies. Evidence-based policy analysis; public speaker, writer.

Education

B.A., Economics and Statistics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

M.A. and Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University

Also: Advanced Management Program, Harvard Business School

Professional Experience

2015- : President & CEO, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
 2012-2015: President: Revenue Watch Institute (RWI – predecessor to NRGI)
 2012- : Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
 2009-2012: Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
 2003-2008: Director, Global Governance & Anti-Corruption, World Bank Institute (WBI)
 2002-2003: Director, Governance & Regional Learning (Latin America), WBI
 1999-2001: Sr. Manager, Regulation, Finance & Governance, WBI
 1998-1999: Lead Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank
 1996-1997: Visiting Scholar, Harvard University
 1992-1996: Chief of Mission for the World Bank, Kiev, Ukraine
 1991-1992: Principal Economist, Post-Socialist Transition Economies, World Bank
 1990-1991: World Development Report: 'The Challenge of Development', World Bank
 1988-1990: Sr. Country Economist, Africa Region, World Bank
 1984-1988: Economist, Industry and Finance, Africa Region, World Bank
 1980-1983: Young Professional Program, and previously R.A., Urban Economics, World Bank
 1976-1980: Teaching Fellow, Lecturer & Tutor (while Ph.D. candidate), Harvard University

Noteworthy:

- Membership in Governance and Advisory Boards: Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), RWI, Ibrahim Foundation, TI, Argüden Governance Academy
- Global datasets on governance: Worldwide Governance Indicators ([WGI](#)); Resource Governance Index ([RGI](#)); Ibrahim Index of African Governance ([IIAG](#))
- Former Global Agenda and Faculty Member, World Economic Forum (Davos)
- Member of High Level Expert Panel on Anti-Corruption for the leadership of OECD and of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); also high level advisor at OAS, IMF.
- Frequent guest lecturer and keynote presenter in global conferences
- Among top authors in Social Science Research Network ([SSRN](#)).
- Policy writings featured in major international media and policy publications
- Dean's List (special honors) Economics & Statistics, Hebrew University
- Highest distinction, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University., Economics

Languages: English, Spanish, Hebrew; some German and Portuguese. **Twitter:** @kaufpost

Short Bio – NRGI: <https://resourcegovernance.org/about-us/daniel-kaufmann>

At Brookings Institution expert page: <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/daniel-kaufmann/>

Born: Santiago, Chile. Married, 2 children. Citizen of Chile. U.S. Resident.

Bibliography

I. Governance, Public Economics, State Capture, and Corruption

"Consolidated Public Expenditures", chapter in *Thailand's Country Study: Managing Public Resources for Structural Adjustment*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1984.

"Governance and Project Performance: An Empirical Investigation" (with J. Isham and L. Pritchett) *Policy Research Working Paper No. 1550*, Policy Research Department, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1995. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=615020

"Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the Dynamics of Post-Socialist Economies" (with A. Kaliberda) *Policy Research Working Paper 1691*, The World Bank: Washington D. C., December 1996. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/postsoc.html>

"The Unofficial Economy in Transition" (with S. Johnson and A. Schleifer), *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1997, No. 2. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/brookings.html>

"Corruption: The Facts", *Foreign Policy*, No. 107, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, D.C., Summer 1997. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/corrfacts.html>

"Politics and Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies" (with S. Johnson), The William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series No. 57, June 1997. <http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp57.pdf>

"Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies" (with P. Siegelbaum), *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50 No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 419-458. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/privcorr.html>

"Civil Liberties and Government Performance" (with J. Isham and L. Pritchett) *World Bank Economic Review*, May 1997. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/pritchet.pdf>

"Anti-Corruption Strategies: Starting Afresh?" in *Curbing Corruption*, F. Stapenhurst, and S. Kpundeh, eds., Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1998. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/curbing.html>

"Corruption in Transition Economies", in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law*, McMillan Publishers Ltd.: London, 1998.

"Research on Corruption: Critical Empirical Issues" in *Economics of Corruption*, Arvind K. Jain, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston, 1998.

"Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Towards Incentive Driven Approaches" in P. Tamesis, ed., *Corruption and Integrity-Improvement Initiatives in Development*, UNDP, 1998.

"Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects" (with L. Pritchett), in *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund and The World Bank: Washington, D.C., March 1998. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/pritchet.pdf>

“Corruption and Development” (with C. Gray), in *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund and The World Bank: Washington, D.C., March 1998.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/corranddev.html>

“La pirámide financiera MMM”, *Revista Perspectivas (Chile)*, May 1998.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/piramide.pdf>

“Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy” (with S. Johnson and P. Zoido), *American Economic Review*, May 1998. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/regdiscretion.html>

“Governance and Corruption in Albania: The Imperative of Institutional Reforms” (with A. Pasha, Z. Preci, R. Ryterman, and P. Zoido-Lobaton) *A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry and Implications*, Prepared for Albania Anti-Corruption Workshop, June 30, 1998.

New Perspectives on Combating Corruption (ed., with M. Schloss), The World Bank and Transparency International, September 1998. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/challenges.html>

“New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combating Corruption” (with R. Ryterman and S. Pradhan) PREM Note No. 7, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., October 1998.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/newfrontiers.html>

“The Forgotten Rational for Policy Reform” (with J. Isham) in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114:1, February 1999.

“Transparency, Liberalization and Financial Crisis” (with G. Mehrez) *Policy Research Working Paper* 2286, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., February 1999.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258976

“Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?” (with S.J. Wei) *National Bureau of Economic Research*, April 1999. [Also *Policy Research Working Paper* 2254, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., December 1999.] [Also *Working Paper No. 00/64*, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., March 2000.]

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/greasemoney.html>

“New Frontiers in World Bank Governance Programs” (with P. Dininio), *Democracy Dialogue*, USAID, June 1999, USAID. <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/techpubs/dialogue/ac3.html>

“Corruption, Public Finances and the Unofficial Economy”, (with S. Johnson and P. Zoido), *Policy Research Working Paper* 2169, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., August 1999.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/corrandpubfin.html>

“Towards Transparency in Finance and Governance” (with T. Vishwanath) *Policy Research Working Paper* (draft), The World Bank: Washington D. C., September 1999.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/transfin.html>

“Aggregating Governance Indicators” (with A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton) *Policy Research Working Paper* 2195, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., October 1999.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/aggindicators.html>

Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African Countries (ed.), Volume for 9th IACC, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., October 1999.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/durban_pdfs/durban1.pdf

"Governance Matters (with A. Kraay and P. Zoido Lobaton) *Policy Research Working Paper 2196*, The World Bank: Washington D.C., October 1999. [Also *Local Government Brief*, January 2001.]

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html>

"Foreword" in *Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention*, R. Klitgaard, R. Maclean-Abaroa and H.L. Parris, Institute for Contemporary Studies Press and World Bank Institute, 2000.

"Predicting Currency Fluctuations and Crises: Do Resident Firms Have an Informational Advantage?" (with G. Mehrez and S. Schmukler), *Policy Research Working Paper 2286*, The World Bank: Washington D.C., February 2000.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/currencyflux.html>

"Beyond the 'Grabbing Hand' of Government in Transition: Facing up to 'State Capture' by the Corporate Sector" (with J. Hellman and G. Jones), *Transition*, April 2000.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/grabbinghand.html>

"Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies" (with J. Hellman, G. Jones and M. Schankerman) *Policy Research Working Paper 2312*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., April 2000.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/measuregov.html>

"Corrupción y Reforma Institucional: El Poder de la Evidencia Empírica, in *Revista Perspectivas*, Santiago, Chile, pp. 367-387, May 2000.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/poderdeeevidencia.pdf>

"Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?" (with J. Hellman and G. Jones), *Transition*, May-June-July 2000.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/fdi_trans.html

"Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries" (with E. Friedman, S. Johnson and P. Zoido-Lobaton), *Journal of Public Economics*, June 2000. Also in Chapter 9 in *The Economics of Transition: The Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics*, Erik Berglof and Gerard Roland, ed., London: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2007.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/dodginghand.html>

"Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism" (with S. Johnson, J. McMillan and C. Woodruff), *Journal of Public Economics*, June 2000. Also in Chapter 10 in *The Economics of Transition: The Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics*, Erik Berglof and Gerard Roland, ed., London: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2007.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/whyhide.html>

"Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action" (with A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton), *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., June 2000.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters.html>

“Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies” (with J. Hellman and G. Jones), *Policy Research Working Paper 2444*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., September 2000, and *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 751-73, December 2003. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/seizestate.html>

“Approaches to Measuring Governance” (with A. Kraay and P. Zoido), in *Global Corruption Report 2001* (R. Hodess, J. Banfield, and T. Wolfe, eds.), Berlin: Transparency International, 2001. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters2001.html>

“Research on Corruption: Critical Issues”, Chapter 7 in *The Political Economy of Corruption*, A. Jain, ed., London, New York: Routledge, 2001. <http://www.voxprof.com/eden/Publications/Uhlenbruck-et-al-OS-2006.pdf>

“Towards Transparency: New Approaches and Their Application to Financial Markets” (with T. Vishwanath), *World Bank Research Observer*, Spring 2001, Volume 16, pp. 41-57. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=873693#PaperDownload

Improving Governance and Controlling Corruption: Towards a Participatory and Action-Oriented Approach Grounded on Empirical Rigor, Course Volume (with M. González de Asís), World Bank Institute: Washington, D.C., June 2001. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/lac2001_core.pdf

“Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies” (with J. Hellman), *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C., September 2001. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm>

“Assessing Governance: Diagnostic Tools and Applied Methods for Capacity Building and Action Learning” (with F. Recanatini), draft mimeo 2002. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/assessing/pdf/kauf_recan_bilet_assessing.pdf

“Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?” (with J. Hellman and G. Jones) 2002. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=386900

“Governance Crossroads”, Chapter in *Global Competitiveness Report 2002-03*, World Economic Forum (P. Cornelius, K. Schwab and M. Porter, eds.), Oxford University Press, 2002.

“Governance Indicators, Aid Allocation and the Millennium Challenge Account” (with A. Kraay), mimeo 2002. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/mca.html>

“Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators from 2000-01” (with A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton), *Policy Research Working Paper 2772*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2002. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters2001.html>

“Misrule of Law”, in FRIDE/Gorbachev symposium of leaders proceeding, Madrid, 2002. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/misruleoflaw.pdf>

“Public and Private Misgovernance in Finance: Perverse Links, Capture, and Their Empirics”, in *Financial Sector Governance* (by R. Litan, M. Pomerleano, V. Sundararajan, eds.), Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

<http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/financialsectorgovernance.htm>

“Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance Based on a Survey of Public Officials” (with G. Mehrez and T. Gurgur), draft 2002.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316865

“Growth without Governance” (with A. Kraay), *Economía*, [Also *Policy Research Working Paper 2928*, World Bank: Washington, D.C.], Winter 2002.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/growthgov.html>

“Governance and Growth in the Very Long Run: Updated Indicators, New Results” (with A. Kraay), in *Global Corruption Report 2003*, Transparency International, London: Profile Books, 2003.

“Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002” (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), *Policy Research Working Paper 3106*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2003, and *World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 253-87, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2004.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=405841

“Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms with Meager Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?” (with M. Mastruzzi and D. Zavaleta), in *In Search of Prosperity*, by D. Rodrik, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316863

“Inequality of Influence” (with J. Hellman), paper presented at the American Economic Association (AEA) Meetings, Chapter in *Trust in Transition*, by S.R. Ackerman and J. Kornai, eds. January 12, 2003.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=386901

“Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy,” Chapter in *Global Competitiveness Report 2002-03*, World Economic Forum, March 2003.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/rethink_gov.html

“Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge”, Chapter in *Global Competitiveness Report 2003-04*, World Economic Forum, October 2003.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govredux.html>

“Anti-Corruption within a Broader Developmental and Governance Perspective: Some Lessons from Empirics and Experience” Statement at the High-Level Political Signing Conference for the United Nations Convention against Corruption, December 9-11, 2003.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/events/merida.html>

“Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge”, paper presented at a conference co-sponsored by the Ethical Globalization Initiative and the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University, New York City, March 1, 2004.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/humanrights.pdf>

“Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World,” Chapter in *Global Competitiveness Report 2004-05*, October 2004.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Kaufmann_GCR_101904_B.pdf

“La Corruption : Remise en Cause de L’orthodoxie Fondée Sur les Preuves,” pp. 1-26 in *Revue Sur la Politique et la Pratique du Développement*, Volume 1, Number 1, December 2004. [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/images.nsf/vLUIImages/Journal Of Development/\\$file/journal-FR.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/images.nsf/vLUIImages/Journal%20Of%20Development/$file/journal-FR.pdf)

“Governance and the City: An Empirical Exploration into Global Determinants of Urban Performance” (with F. Léautier and M. Mastruzzi), *Policy Research Working Paper*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., forthcoming 2005. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govcity.pdf>

“Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge”, Chapter in *Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement*, 2005. <http://www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-928462-8.pdf>

“Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data,” (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), Chapter in *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption* edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2005. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20798994~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1976990~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html>

“A befolyas egyenlotlensege” (with J. S. Hellman), Chapter 5 in *Tisztesség és bizalom a posztoszocialista átmenet fenyegeben*, K. Janos and S. Rose-Ackerman ed., Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 2005.

“Click Refresh Button: Investment Climate Reconsidered,” Chapter in *Development Outreach*, March 2005. <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/mar05/article.asp?id=283>

“Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004”, (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), *Policy Research Working Paper #3630*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., May 2005. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters%20IV%20main.pdf>

“Governance Matters IV: New Data, New Challenges”, (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), synthesis paper, The World Bank, May 2005. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Synthesis_GovMatters_IV.pdf

“Ten Myths on Governance and Corruption”, *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund: Washington, Washington, D.C. September 2005 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/09/basics.htm>

“Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy Applications” (with A. Bellver), *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (draft)*, September 2005. http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Transparenting_Transparency171005.pdf

“Better Governance Will Fight Corruption,” in *Environmental Forum: The Policy Journal of Environmental Law Institute*, September/October 2005.

“Media, Governance and Development: An Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention,” *Media Matters: Perspectives on Advancing Governance & Development from the Global Forum for Media Development*, October 2005. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/press_freedom_day_keynote.pdf

“Legal Corruption” (with P. Vicente), second draft, The World Bank: Washington, D.C. October 2005. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/Legal_Corruption.pdf

"Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption", Chapter in *Global Competitiveness Report 2005-06*, World Economic Forum, October 2005.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/21_Governance_and_Corruption_Kaufmann.pdf

"How does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru" (with J. Montoriol-Garriga and F. Recanatini), The World Bank, November 2005.

"Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities," (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), Chapter in *Development Outreach*, September 2006.

<http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/september06/article.asp?id=371>

"Governance matters V: aggregate and individual governance indicators for 1996 - 2005," (with A. Kraay, M. Mastruzzi) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 4012, September 2006.

"Human Rights, Governance, and Development: An Empirical Perspective," Article in *Development Outreach*, October 2006. <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/october06/article.asp?id=382>

"On Measuring Governance: Framing Issues for Debate" (with A. Kraay), at a Roundtable Discussion at the World Bank, January 11, 2007

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-1149112210081/2604389-1167941884942/On_Measuring_Governance.pdf

"The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics," (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), The World Bank: Washington, D.C. March 2007.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-1149112210081/2604389-1167941884942/Answering_Critics.pdf

"Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006" (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280, February 2007.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979#PaperDownload

A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance, (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), The World Bank, Washington, D.C., July 2007.

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/pdf/booklet_decade_of_measuring_governance.pdf

"Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?" (with A. Kraay). World Bank Research Observer, January 2008.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/KKGovernanceIndicatorsSurveyWBROSpring2008.pdf>

"Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007" (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), *Policy Research Working Paper 4654*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C. 2008. Weblink to SSRN:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148386

"On Democracy and Development: Rejecting the Extremes", chapter in *eJournal USA: Markets and Democracy*, Vol 13, Number 6. U. S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., June, 2008.

<http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhr-english/2008/June/20080605094537ebyeessed0.3466913.html>¹

‘Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis’, Forbes, January 2009
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-corruption09_0127corruption.html

‘Aid Effectiveness and Governance’, Development Outreach, The World Bank, March 2009
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/kaufmann-corrected.pdf>

‘Aid Effectiveness and Governance: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, March 2009.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0317_aid_governance_kaufmann.aspx

‘Good Governance and the G-20: Learning from the Missing Countries’, in *The G-20 London Summit 2009: Recommendations for Global Policy Coordination*, Brookings Institution, March 2009.
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/~/_media/Files/rc/reports/2009/0326_g20_summit/0326_g20_summit_kaufmann.pdf

‘The G-20 and the End of Ideology: From Washington to London to New York’ Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, April 2009
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0409_g20_kaufmann.aspx

‘On Governance, Rule of Law and Development: Some Concepts, Comparative Measures and Reflections’, background paper for presentation at the Second Law and Order Conference, Seoul, Korea, June 24, 2009.

‘Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008’ (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), *Policy Research Working Paper 4978*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2009.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424591 and also at Brookings at:
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/06_governance_indicators_kaufmann.aspx

‘Governance Matters 2009: Learning from Over a Decade of Worldwide Governance Indicators’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, June 2009.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0629_governance_indicators_kaufmann.aspx

‘Reflections on Governance and Anti-Corruption Challenges and Strategic Considerations for Paraguay’, mimeo, September 2009. [Available upon request]

‘The G-20 Governments Should Look at Their Own Governance’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, September 2009.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0930_g20_kaufmann.aspx

¹ Also available in Arabic: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-arabic/2008/June/20081209091224snmassabla0.990307.html>
 Chinese: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-chinese/2008/June/20080821151847ebyeessed0.6435511.html>
 French: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-french/2008/July/20080707174242jreeduos0.6029741.html>
 Persian: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-persian/2008/June/20080728102918ebyeessed0.7728693.html>
 Russian: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-russian/2008/August/20080827155151ebyeessed0.35487.html>
 Spanish: <http://www.america.gov/st/democracy-spanish/2008/July/20080708125904td0.6732294.html>

‘Nobel Prize in Economics: Illusions from Tinbergen to Keynes’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, October 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1015_nobel_prize_economics_kaufmann.aspx

‘Seven: Tentative Tenets on Governance Indicators’, at the APSA Conference on Democracy Audits and Governmental Indicators, at UC Berkley, Berkley, CA, October 2009.

<http://indicatorsinfo.pbworks.com/f/Kaufmann.pdf>

‘Towards Sounder and Comparable Indicators to Benchmark Progress in Society’ (with S. Young), background paper for the Global Agency Council (GAC) of the World Economic Forum, November 2009. [Available upon request]

‘Corruption Index Today, Election Tomorrow, Aid Revamp the Day After?’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, November 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1118_corruption_aid_kaufmann.aspx

‘International Anti-Corruption Day 2009: Time to Reflect and Reboot’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institutions, December 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1209_corruption_kaufmann.aspx

‘Financial Sector Power: Is it Shifting Back to Wall Street?’, Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institutions, December 2009.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1215_financial_sector_kaufmann.aspx

‘Good Governance for Sustained Growth and Development’, in ed. López-Claros, A., *The Innovation for Development Report 2009-2010: Strengthening Innovation for the Prosperity of Nations*, European Business School, 2010.

“Will Profiling Make our Skies Safer? A Governance Perspective on New TSA Guidelines,” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 7 January 2010

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0107_governance_tsa_kaufmann.aspx

“Beyond Emergency Relief for Haiti: The Challenge of Effective Development Assistance,” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 19 January 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0119_haiti_kaufmann.aspx

“Rule of Law Matters: Unorthodoxy in Brief,” Research Report, Brookings Institution, 21 January 2010. http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0121_governance_kaufmann.aspx

“Rule of Law Matters: A De Factor Reboot Neded?” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 21 January 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0121_governance_kaufmann.aspx

“Revamping Aviation Security: Think Outside of he Terminal,” Research & Commentary Web-ed., Brookings Institution, 10 February 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0210_aviation_security_kaufmann.aspx

“Capture by ‘Main Street’”: Was the Car Safety Regulatory Agency Asleep at the Wheel?” Research & Commentary Web-ed., Brookings Institution, 11 February 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0211_toyota_safety_kaufmann.aspx

“Guns and Death from Massachusetts to Alabama: Misrule of Law?” Research & Commentary Web-ed., Brookings Institution, 17 February 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0217_guns_law_kaufmann.aspx

“National Disasters Teach Unorthodox Lessons on Governance,” Research & Commentary Web-ed., Brookings Institution, 2 March 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0302_governance_disaster_kaufmann.aspx

“Natural Disasters, National Diligence: The Chilean Earthquake in Perspective,” (with J. Tessada) Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 5 March 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0305_chile_earthquake_kaufmann.aspx

“What Happens in Cancun Shouldn’t Stay in Cancun: Toward Transparency at the Inter-American Development Bank.” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 19 March 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0319_transparency_kaufmann.aspx

“Transparent Aid for Haiti’s Reconstruction: Capture Matters,” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 30 March 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0330_haiti_transparency_kaufmann.aspx

“Breaking the Cycle of Crime and Corruption?,” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 14 April 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0414_corruption_crime_kaufmann.aspx

“Can Corruption Adversely Affect Public Finances in Industrialized Countries?” Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 19 April 2010.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0419_corruption_kaufmann.aspx

“Does Bribing ‘Pay’ for Corporations?,” Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, 10 May 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/05/10-corporate-bribery-kaufmann>

“To Meet the Millennium Development Goals, Think Governance,” (with V. Penciakova) Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 18 May 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/05/18-mdg-governance-kaufmann>

“Blowing the Vuvuzela on FIFA’s Governance Challenges: Reforms for Development,” (with V. Penciakova) Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 9 July 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/07/09-world-cup-kaufmann>

“Financial Regulatory Reform: Less than Meets the Eye on Financial Institutions, More than Meets the Eye on Oil Companies,” Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, 16 July 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/07/16-financial-reform-kaufmann>

“Global Governance, Human Rights and Sports: FIFA Needs to Act Swiftly on North Korea,” Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, 3 August 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/08/03-human-rights-kaufmann>

“Around the Halls: The UN’s Millennium Development Goals,” Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, 16 September 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/09/16-halls-mdg>

"The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues," (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), *Brookings Institution Working Paper*, 24 September 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2010/09/wgi-kaufmann>

"Governance Matters 2010: Worldwide Governance Indicators Highlight Governance Successes, Reversals and Failures," Research & Commentary Web-ed, Brookings Institution, 24 September 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/24-wgi-kaufmann>

"The Riveting Rescue of 33 Chilean Miners: An Act of People, Leaders and Good Governance," Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, 13 October 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/10/13-chile-rescue-kaufmann>

"Tunisia, Egypt and Beyond: Fewer Predictions, More Data and Aid Reform Needed," (with V. Penciakova and S. Pasali) Brookings Institution, February 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/02/02-egypt-development-kaufmann>

"Libya's Startling Failure: Unforeseen or Ignored?" Brookings Institution, February 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/02/25-libya-kaufmann>

"Qaddafi's Corrupt Influence in the U.S.: International State Capture?" Brookings Institution, March 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/03/07-qaddafi-kaufmann>

"Japan's Triple Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Crises," (with V. Penciakova), Brookings Institution, March 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/16-japan-disaster-kaufmann>

"Amid Global Crises, Can Obama Make a Real Impact in Latin America," Brookings Institution, March 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/03/16-halls-latin-america>

"Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Assessing Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United States," (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, April 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/01-nuclear-meltdown-kaufmann>

"On Africa's New Dawn: From Premature Exuberance to Tempered Optimism", (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, June 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/06/07-africa-new-dawn-kaufmann>

"Open Government Partnership: First Steps and the Road Ahead," (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, July 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/07/19-open-government-kaufmann>

"Congress' Dismal Performance Need Not be the Case: A Governance Perspective," Brookings Institution, July 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/07/29-congress-performance-kaufmann>

"Unexpected East Coast Earthquake Spurs US Stock Market Rally: Adding to the 'Ridicu-list' of Politician's Economic Statements?" Brookings Institution, August 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/08/24-earthquake-stock-market-kaufmann>

"The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): 1996-2010 " (with A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi), at www.govindicators.org September 2011.

"Governance and the Arab World Transition: Reflections, Empirics and Implications for the International Community," in "From Aid to Global Development Cooperation", 2011 Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Briefs, September 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/09/governance-arab-world-kaufmann>

Economic Transition in the Arab World co-author with H. Kharas, R. Desai and others, Monograph Oxford University Press, November 2011

"Judge Rakoff Challenge to the SEC: Can Regulatory Capture be Reversed?" (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, December 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/02-rakoff-challenge-kaufmann>

"Transparency, Conflict Minerals and Natural Resources: Debating Sections 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act," Brookings Institution, December 2011.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/20-debating-dodd-frank-kaufmann>

"How Warm was Latin America's Welcome for Ahmadinejad? Misgovernance in One Chart," Brookings Institution, January 2012

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/01/17-iran-latin-america-kaufmann>

"Finding a Path to Inclusive Growth in Arab Economies," (with K. Derviş, H. Ghanem and H. Kharas) Brookings Institution, March 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/finding-a-path-to-inclusive-growth-in-arab-economies/> "Governance, Aid and Corruption in Transition: Taking State Capture Seriously," Brookings Institution, March 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/governance-aid-and-corruption-in-transition-taking-state-capture-seriously/>

"How Selective is Donor Aid? Governance and Corruption Matter and Donor Agencies Should Take Notice," (with V. Penciakova), Brookings Institution, July 2012

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-selective-is-donor-aid-governance-and-corruption-matter-and-donor-agencies-should-take-notice/>

"Development, Aid and Governance: Connecting the Empirical Dots," (with H. Kharas and V. Penciakova), Brookings Institution, July 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/07/17/development-aid-and-governance-connecting-the-empirical-dots/>

"Aurora and the U.S. Obsession with Guns: Leadership Wanted to Fight Political Capture," Brookings Institution, July 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aurora-and-the-u-s-obsession-with-guns-leadership-wanted-to-fight-political-capture/>

"SEC's Day of Reckoning on Transparency: Dodd-Frank Section 1504 on Disclosure of Natural Resource Revenues," Brookings Institution, July 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-secs-day-of-reckoning-transparency-in-dodd-frank-section-1504-and-disclosure-of-natural-resources/>

SEC Passes Natural Resource Transparency and Conflict Minerals Rules: The Glass is Fuller than Expected," (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, August 2012

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-secs-day-of-reckoning-transparency-in-dodd-frank-section-1504-and-disclosure-of-natural-resources/>

- “Poverty in the Midst of Abundance: Governance Matters for Overcoming the Resource Curse,” Brookings Institution, September 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/poverty-in-the-midst-of-abundance-governance-matters-for-overcoming-the-resource-curse/>
- “Rethinking the fight against corruption,” Brookings Institution (and Huffington Post), Nov. 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rethinking-the-fight-against-corruption/>
- “By The People? Foreign Aid and Donor-Country Democracy” (with E.F. McGuirk and P.C. Vicente), 2012. https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1373/1373635_mcguirk.pdf
- “Good countries or good projects? Macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance” (with C. Denizer and A. Kraay) *Journal of Development Economics*, 105, pp.288-302. April 2013 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/DenizerKaufmannKraayGoodCountriesorGoodProjectsApril2013.pdf>
- “Era of Big Oil Secrecy is Over,” Brookings Institution, April 2013 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/era-of-big-oil-secrecy-is-over/>
- “Trillions of Dollars in Oil, Gas and Mining Revenue Still Shrouded in Secrecy,” Brookings Institution, May 2013 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/trillions-of-dollars-in-oil-gas-and-mining-revenue-still-shrouded-in-secrecy/>
- “Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms” (with D’Souza) *Economics of Governance*, 14(4), pp.333-367. August 2013 <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10101-013-0130-5>
- “Transparency in Natural Resources: Why is the U.S. Playing Catch Up?,” Brookings Institution, June 2014 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/06/09/transparency-in-natural-resources-why-is-the-u-s-playing-catch-up/>
- “Governance Matters: Civil Society Voice and Performance at the World Cup,” July 2014, Huffington Post at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/danielkaufmann/governance-matters-civil-world-cup_b_5599812.html and Brookings Institution, July 2014 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/07/07/explaining-success-at-the-world-cup-money-or-governance/>
- “La gobernanza es clave para los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible en la Agenda Post 2015,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), November 2014 <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/la-gobernanza-es-clave-para-los-objetivos-de-desarrollo-sostenible-en-la-agenda-post-2015>
- “The Time is Now for Addressing Resource Governance Challenges in Latin America,” Brookings Institution, February 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/02/09/the-time-is-now-for-addressing-resource-governance-challenges-in-latin-america/>
- “Amidst Scandal and Crisis, a Way Forward For Resource Governance in Latin America,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2015

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/amidst-scandal-and-crisis-way-forward-resource-governance-latin-america>²

"NRGI Recognized as 'Highly Transparent'," NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2015 <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/nrgi-recognized-highly-transparent>

"Governance and the lucrative extractive industries," Corruption Matters, New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Issue 45, June 2015
<https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/newsletter/issue45/apsacc.html>

"Evidence-based Reflections on Natural Resource Governance and Corruption in Africa," in *Africa at a Fork in the Road: Taking Off or Disappointment Once Again?*, ed. E. Zedillo, O Catteno and H Wheeler, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2015
<https://ycsg.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/africa.pdf>

"Evidence-based Reflections on Natural Resource Governance and Corruption in Africa," NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), June 2015 <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/evidence-based-reflections-natural-resource-governance-and-corruption>

"Responding to the Challenge of Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries," (with A. Gillies and M. George-Wagner) NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), September 2015
<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/responding-challenge-corruption-resource-rich-countries>

"Corruption matters". *Finance & Development*, 52(3), pp.20-23. September 2015
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/09/kaufmann.htm>, and also at NRG in English, Spanish, Arabic and Russian at: <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/corruption-matters>

"Seizing the governance moment: The pope, Sustainable Development Goals, and data," Brookings Institution, September 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/25/seizing-the-governance-moment-the-pope-sustainable-development-goals-and-data/>

"United States moves to recapture its position as a leader on extractives transparency," (with J. Williams) Brookings Institution, December 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/12/15/united-states-moves-to-recapture-its-position-as-a-leader-on-extractives-transparency/>

"From Panama to London: Legal and illegal corruption require action at the UK anti-corruption summit," (with A. Gillies) Brookings Institution, May 2016 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/09/from-panama-to-london-legal-and-illegal-corruption-require-action-at-the-uk-anti-corruption-summit/>³

"Summit Supercharges Anticorruption Work, But We Must Aim Higher;" (with A. Gillies and J. Williams) NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), May 2016

² Also available in Spanish: <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/en-medio-de-esc%C3%A1ndalo-y-crisis-un-camino-seguir-hacia-la-gobernanza-de-los-recursos-naturales>

³ Also available in French: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/19/de-panama-a-londres-agir-contre-la-corruption-legale-et-illegale-au-sommet-anticorruption-du-royaume-uni/>
And also at NRG in Spanish at: <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/de-panama-londres-la-corrupcion-legal-e-illegal-necesita-de-la-accion-de-la-cumbre>

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/summit-supercharges-anticorruption-work-we-must-aim-higher>

“London calling about corruption: How will countries rich and poor answer—and what does it mean for Africa?,” (with A. Gillies), Brookings Institution, May 2016

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/05/23/london-calling-about-corruption-how-will-countries-rich-and-poor-answer-and-what-does-it-mean-for-africa/>

“Close to home: The critical importance of subnational governance in oil, gas, and mining,” (with R. Iwerks), Brookings Institution, September 2016

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/09/27/close-to-home-the-critical-importance-of-subnational-governance-in-oil-gas-and-mining/>

“Three Key Tasks for Guinea as Stakeholders Seek to Improve Mining Governance.” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2017

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/three-key-tasks-guinea-stakeholders-seek-improve-mining-governance>

“Trump should think again on mining transparency law”, The Commodities Note, Financial Times, March 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/559148ec-032a-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9>

“Measuring the ups and downs of governance”, (with A. Kraay) Brookings Institution, September 2017 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/09/22/measuring-the-ups-and-downs-of-governance/>

“US credibility suffers in exit from extractives transparency pact,” The Commodities Note, Financial Times, November 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/280001f0-c3ca-11e7-a1d2-6786f39ef675?conceptId=1bab8efd-0afa-3f5c-9f46-90853b988c81&desktop=true&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8> and also at

NRGI at <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/us-credibility-suffers-exit-extractives-transparency-pact>

“Which Countries Have Successfully Managed Mineral Reserves?,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), November 2017

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/which-countries-have-successfully-managed-mineral-reserves>

“US vacuum in global governance opens space for others,” (with V. Thomas) beyondbrics, Financial Times, January 2018 <https://www.ft.com/content/77320836-ff6b-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5> and also at

NRGI at <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/title-us-vacuum-global-governance-opens-space-others>

“What makes an accountable state-owned enterprise?,” (with P. Heller and A. Gillies) Brookings Institution, March 2018 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/03/26/what-makes-an-accountable-state-owned-enterprise/>

II. Extractive Industries Governance

“SEC’s Day of Reckoning on Transparency: Dodd-Frank Section 1504 on Disclosure of Natural Resource Revenues,” Brookings Institution, July 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-secs-day-of-reckoning-transparency-in-dodd-frank-section-1504-and-disclosure-of-natural-resources/>

“SEC Passes Natural Resource Transparency and Conflict Minerals Rules: The Glass is Fuller than Expected,” (with V. Penciakova) Brookings Institution, August 2012

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-secs-day-of-reckoning-transparency-in-dodd-frank-section-1504-and-disclosure-of-natural-resources/>

“Poverty in the Midst of Abundance: Governance Matters for Overcoming the Resource Curse,” Brookings Institution, September 2012 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/poverty-in-the-midst-of-abundance-governance-matters-for-overcoming-the-resource-curse/>

“Era of Big Oil Secrecy is Over,” Brookings Institution, April 2013
<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/era-of-big-oil-secrecy-is-over/>

“Trillions of Dollars in Oil, Gas and Mining Revenue Still Shrouded in Secrecy,” Brookings Institution, May 2013 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/trillions-of-dollars-in-oil-gas-and-mining-revenue-still-shrouded-in-secrecy/>

“Transparency in Natural Resources: Why is the U.S. Playing Catch Up?,” Brookings Institution, June 2014 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/06/09/transparency-in-natural-resources-why-is-the-u-s-playing-catch-up/>

“The Time is Now for Addressing Resource Governance Challenges in Latin America,” Brookings Institution, February 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/02/09/the-time-is-now-for-addressing-resource-governance-challenges-in-latin-america/>

“Amidst Scandal and Crisis, a Way Forward For Resource Governance in Latin America,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2015
<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/amidst-scandal-and-crisis-way-forward-resource-governance-latin-america>⁴

“Governance and the lucrative extractive industries,” Corruption Matters, New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Issue 45, June 2015
<https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/newsletter/issue45/apsacc.html> and also at NRG at <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/governance-and-lucrative-extractive-industries>

“Evidence-based Reflections on Natural Resource Governance and Corruption in Africa,” in *Africa at a Fork in the Road: Taking Off or Disappointment Once Again?*, ed. E. Zedillo, O Catteno and H Wheeler, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2015
<https://ycsg.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/africa.pdf>, also summary at NRG, <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/evidence-based-reflections-natural-resource-governance-and-corruption>

“Responding to the Challenge of Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries,” (with A. Gillies and M. George-Wagner) NRG, September 2015 <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/responding-challenge-corruption-resource-rich-countries>

“Corruption matters”. *Finance & Development*, 52(3), pp.20-23. September 2015
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/09/kaufmann.htm>

⁴ Also available in Spanish: <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/en-medio-de-esc%C3%A1ndalo-y-crisis-un-camino-seguir-hacia-la-gobernanza-de-los-recursos-naturales>

and also at NRGi in English, Spanish, Arabic and Russian at <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/corruption-matters>

“Seizing the governance moment: The pope, Sustainable Development Goals, and data,” Brookings Institution, September 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/25/seizing-the-governance-moment-the-pope-sustainable-development-goals-and-data/>

“United States moves to recapture its position as a leader on extractives transparency,” (with J. Williams) Brookings Institution, December 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/12/15/united-states-moves-to-recapture-its-position-as-a-leader-on-extractives-transparency/>

“From Panama to London: Legal and illegal corruption require action at the UK anti-corruption summit,” (with A. Gillies) Brookings Institution, May 2016 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/09/from-panama-to-london-legal-and-illegal-corruption-require-action-at-the-uk-anti-corruption-summit/>⁵

“Summit Supercharges Anticorruption Work, But We Must Aim Higher,” (with A. Gillies and J. Williams) NRGi Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), May 2016 <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/summit-supercharges-anticorruption-work-we-must-aim-higher>

“London calling about corruption: How will countries rich and poor answer—and what does it mean for Africa?,” (with A. Gillies), Brookings Institution, May 2016 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/05/23/london-calling-about-corruption-how-will-countries-rich-and-poor-answer-and-what-does-it-mean-for-africa/>

“Close to home: The critical importance of subnational governance in oil, gas, and mining,” (with R. Iwerks), Brookings Institution, September 2016 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/09/27/close-to-home-the-critical-importance-of-subnational-governance-in-oil-gas-and-mining/>

“Three Key Tasks for Guinea as Stakeholders Seek to Improve Mining Governance.” NRGi Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2017 <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/three-key-tasks-guinea-stakeholders-seek-improve-mining-governance>

“Trump should think again on mining transparency law”, Financial Times, March 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/559148ec-032a-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9>

“US credibility suffers in exit from extractives transparency pact,” Financial Times, November 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/280001f0-c3ca-11e7-a1d2-6786f39ef675?conceptId=1bab8efd-0afa-3f5c-9f46-90853b988c81&desktop=true&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8> and also at NRGi at <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/us-credibility-suffers-exit-extractives-transparency-pact>

⁵ Also available in French: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/19/de-panama-a-londres-agir-contre-la-corruption-legale-et-illegale-au-sommet-anticorruption-du-royaume-uni/>
And also at NRGi in Spanish at: <https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/de-panama-londres-la-corrupcion-legal-e-illegal-necesita-de-la-accion-de-la-cumbre>

“Which Countries Have Successfully Managed Mineral Reserves?,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), November 2017

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/which-countries-have-successfully-managed-mineral-reserves>

“U.S. Oil Majors Must End Transparency Hypocrisy,” NRG Blog, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), February 2018

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/us-oil-majors-must-end-transparency-hypocrisy>

“Switzerland Should Oblige its Traders to Disclose Payments,” NZZamSonntag, February 2018

<https://nzzas.nzz.ch/meinungen/schweiz-sollte-rohstoffhaendler-zur-offenlegung-verpflichten-id.1358250?reduced=true> and also in English at NRGI at

<https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/switzerland-should-oblige-its-traders-disclose-payments>

“What makes an accountable state-owned enterprise?,” (with P. Heller and A. Gillies) Brookings Institution, March 2018 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/03/26/what-makes-an-accountable-state-owned-enterprise/>

III. Trade, Investment, Industry and Regulation

Ethiopia: Trade and Industrial Sector Review, Report No. 5301-ET, The World Bank, December 1985.

Zambia: Trade and Industrial Restructuring Project, President Report No. P-4119-ZA, The World Bank, August 1985.

Swaziland Industry Review: Investment Prospects, Policies and Institutional Reform, Report No. 6411-SW, The World Bank, September 1986.

Tanzania: An Agenda for Trade Reform and Industrial Recovery, Report No. 6357-TA, The World Bank, June 1987.

Tanzania: Industrial Rehabilitation and Trade Adjustment Program, President Report No. P-4944-TA, The World Bank, November 1988.

“Exchange Rate and Trade Policy”, in *Angola Economic Report*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., June 1991.

“A Pricing Liberalization Strategy for Russia”, mimeo, The World Bank, Washington: D.C., December 1991.

“Dualism in Trade and Surrender of Export Proceeds: A high cost strategy for Russia”, mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., December 1991.

“Energy Pricing and Taxation in Russia: Short-term Macroeconomic and Trade Implications”; (with S. Gulati), mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., December 1991.

“Market Liberalization in Ukraine: To Regain a Lost pillar of Economic Reform,” *Transition*, Vol. 5, No. 7, September 1994. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/1994/09/01/000009265_3971031092315/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf

"Measuring Administrative Controls", *Transition*, Vol. 5, 1994.

<http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/pdf/sep94.pdf>

"Diminishing Returns to Administrative Controls and the Emergence of the Unofficial Economy: a Framework of Analysis and Applications to Ukraine", *Economic Policy*, 19, 1995.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/econlib.html>

"Market Liberalization By Stealth: Curse or Blessing in Disguise?" in *Trade in the New Independent States*, Michalopoulos and Tarr, eds., The World Bank and UNDP, 1995.

<http://www.eurasiacenter.org/Archive/1990-1999/10%20Michalopoulos%20and%20Tarr.doc>

"La pirámide financiera MMM", *Revista Perspectivas (Chile)*, May 1998.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/piramide.pdf>

Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukrainian Data (with D. Marin and Bogdan Gorochofskij, April 2000.

"How Policies and Institutions Affect Project Performance: Microeconomic Evidence on Aid, Policies, and Investment Productivity" (with J. Isham) in *The World Bank: Policies and Structures*, C. Gilbert and D. Vines, eds., Cambridge Books, August 2000.

http://www.cup.org/ObjectBuilder/ObjectBuilder.iwx?ProcessName=ProductPage&Merchant_Id=1&product_id=0-521-79095-6&origin=search&searchField=ALL&searchString=world%20bank

"The Firms Speak" (with G. Batra and A. Stone) in *Pathways out of Poverty: Private Firms and Economic Mobility in Developing Countries* by G. Fields and G. Pfeffermann. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/firmsspeak.pdf>

Investment Climate around the World: Voices of the Firms from the World Business Environment Survey (with G. Batra and A. Stone) The World Bank, 2003.

"Reformas estructurales que ayudan a mejorar el buen gobierno" in *El Crecimiento Economico Y La Globalizacion*, Senado de la Republica Banco de Mexico, 2003.

'Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis', *Forbes*, January 2009,

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0127_corruption_kaufmann.aspx

IV. Macroeconomics

"Consolidated Public Expenditures", in *Thailand's Country Study: Managing Public Resources for Structural Adjustment*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1984.

"Exchange Rate Overvaluation in Zambia: Analytical Issues and Evidence", with M. Penalver, mimeo, April 1985.

"Zambia's Foreign Exchange Auction: An Analysis of its Performance and Impact", mimeo, April 1986.

"On the Relevance of the Nominal Exchange Rate as a Policy Instrument", mimeo, presented to the Bank's Chief and Lead Economists' Meeting, June 1990.

"The Macroeconomics of the Unofficial Foreign Exchange Market in Tanzania" (with S. A. O'Connell), in A. Chhibber and S. Fischer, eds., *Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991: p.50-65.

"The Macroeconomics of the Unofficial Foreign Exchange Market in Tanzania" (with S. O'Connell), in *Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa* (A. Chhibber. and S. Fischer, eds.), December, 1991.

Tanzania Economic Report: Towards Sustainable Development in the 1990s, Country Macro-Economic Report No. 9352-TA, The World Bank, June 1991.

"Does Policy Based Lending Affect the Productivity of Investment Projects?" (with J. Isham), Background paper for *Adjustment Lending and Mobilization of Private and*

Public Resources for Growth, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1992.

"Fiscal and Monetary Effects of the Parallel Premium: Theory and Evidence", (with S. O'Connell), mimeo, July 1992.

"How Macroeconomic Policies Affect Social Projects" (with Y. Wang) *Policy Research Working Paper N. 939*, Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1992.

Ukraine: Country Economic Memorandum, Report 10029-UA, June 1993.

"The Macroeconomics of Delayed Exchange Rate Unification: Theory and Evidence from Tanzania," (with S. A. O'Connell), Harvard Institute for International Development DDP No. 560, November 1996. [Also *World Bank Policy Paper 2060*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., February 1999.]

"Fiscal and Monetary Effects of the Parallel Premium: Theory and the Tanzanian Case" (with S. A. O'Connell), chapter 7 in *Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries*, Kiguel, Lizondo and O'Connell, eds., London: MacMillan and New York: St. Martin's, 1997, p.247-90. [Also available as "The Macroeconomics of Delayed Exchange Rate Unification: Theory and Evidence from Tanzania", Development Discussion Paper No. 560, Harvard Institute for International Development, November 1996.] <http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/documents/oconCV.pdf>

"Exchange Controls and the Parallel Premium in Tanzania, 1965-1990" (with S. O'Connell) in *Parallel Markets in Developing Countries* (Kiguel et al, eds.), 1998.

"New Perspectives on Combating Corruption" (ed., with M. Schloss), The World Bank and Transparency International, September 1998.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/challenges.html>

"Predicting Currency Fluctuations and Crises: Do Resident Firms Have an Informational Advantage?" (with G. Mehrez and S. Schmukler) *Policy Research Working Paper 2286*, The World Bank: Washington D.C., February 2000, and in *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2005.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/currencyflux.html>

V. Private Sector Development, Privatization, and Finance

"The Benefits of Investment in Infrastructure: A Methodology to Evaluate Sites and Services Urban Programs" (with J. Quigley) *Journal of Development Economics*, 1987.

"The Climate for Enterprise", in *World Development Report: The Challenge of Development*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., June 1991.

"The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects" (with J. Isham), *Policy Research Working Paper No. 1549*, Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1995. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880260#

"Macroeconomic Policies and Project Performance in the Social Sectors: A Model of Human Capital Production and Evidence from LDC'S" (with Y. Wang), *World Development* 23(5): 751-765, 1995.

"Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the Dynamics of Post-Socialist Economies: A Framework of Analysis and Evidence," (with A. Kaliberda), in *Economic Transition in the Newly Independent States*, B. Kaminski, ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

"A policy analysis of the cotton sector in Tanzania", (with R. Southworth), mimeo, The World Bank.

An 'Unofficial' Analysis of Economies in Transition: An Empirical Framework and Lessons for Policy", (with A. Kaliberda), Harvard Institute for International Development DDP No. 558, Cambridge, October 1996.

"The Missing Pillar of a Growth Strategy for Ukraine: Institutional and Policy Reforms for Private Sector Development," in *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market*, ed. P. Cornelius and P. Lenain, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C, 1997.
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/ukraine_pillar.pdf

"Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies", (with P. Siegelbaum), *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 419-458, Winter 1997.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/privcorr.html>

"The Unofficial Economy in Transition" (with S. Johnson and A. Schleifer), *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, No. 2, 1997. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/brookings.html>

"Why Is Ukraine's (and Russia's) Economy Not Growing?", *Transition*, May 1997.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/ukrnotruss.html>

"La pirámide financiera MMM", *Revista Perspectivas (Chile)*, May 1998.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/piramide.pdf>

"Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy" (with S. Johnson and P. Zoido-Lobaton) *American Economic Review*, May, 1998. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/regdiscretion.html>

"The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform. The Productivity of Investment Projects" (with J. Isham), *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 1999.

Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?" (with J. Hellman and G. Jones), *Policy Research Working Paper*, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., forthcoming, 2002.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/farfromhome.html>

"Public and Private Misgovernance in Finance: Perverse Links, Capture, and Their Empirics", in *Financial Sector Governance* (by R. Litan, M. Pomerleano, V. Sundararajan, eds.), Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

<http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/financialsectorgovernance.htm>

"The Firms Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on Private Sector Development" (with G. Batra and A.H.W. Stone), in *Pathways out of Poverty*, G. Fields and G. Pfefferman, eds., Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

"Voices of the Firms 2000: Investment Climate and Governance Findings of the World Business Environment Survey (WBES)" (with G. Batra and A.H.W. Stone), 2003.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/voicesfirms.html>

Investment Climate around the World: Voices of the Firms from the World Business Environment Survey (with G. Batra and A. Stone) The World Bank, 2003.

"Click Refresh Button: Investment Climate Reconsidered," Chapter in *Development Outreach*, March 2005. <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/mar05/article.asp?id=283>

VI. Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment

Tanzania: Policy Framework Papers I, II, and III (1987, 1988 and *Country Strategy Paper*, 1989), The World Bank: Washington, D.C.

"A note on a lending strategy for the FSU", The World Bank: Washington, D.C.: May 1992.

"Russia and FSU: Defining Positions on Economic Policy for Russia and the Republics", The World Bank: Washington, D.C., February 1992.

Ukraine: an Economic Reform Program, mimeo, 1993.

"Economic Reform 'Correction' in Ukraine? Myth and Reality", mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1996.

"Listening to Stakeholders' Views about Their Development Challenges and World Bank Instruments", mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1997.

VII. Poverty, Social Sectors, Household, Urban and Labor Economics

"Income Transfers within Extended Families to Meet Basic Needs: The Evidence from El Salvador" (with D. Lindauer) *World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 644*, 1984.

"Patterns of Income Formation and Expenditures among the Urban Poor in Cartagena, Colombia", Final report on RPO 672-57; Report UDD-63 (with M. Bamberger), 1984.

"How do Poor Households Live: The Case of Cartagena, Colombia" (with M. Bamberger and E. Velez), Instituto SER, 1985.

"A Model of Income Transfers for the Urban Poor" (with D. Lindauer) *Journal of Development Economics*, 1986.

"The Benefits of Investment in Infrastructure: A Methodology to evaluate Sites and Services Urban Programs" (with J. Quigley) *Journal of Development Economics*, 1987.

"The consumption benefits of investment in infrastructure: The evaluation of sites-and-services programs in underdeveloped countries," (with J. Quigley) *Journal of Development Economics*, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pp. 263-284, April 1987.

"Formal Employment and Survival Strategies under Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union" (with S. Johnson and O. Ustenko) in *Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies*, J. M. Nelson, C. Tilley and L. Walker, eds., National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997.

"Formal Employment and Survival Strategies Under Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union" (with S. Johnson and O. Ustenko), in *Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies* (J. M. Nelson, C. Tilley and L. Walker, eds.), National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 1997.

<http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/transform/ch7.htm>

"Social Networks in Transition" (with L. Barberia and S. Johnson), The William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series No. 102, October 1997.

<http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp102.pdf>

"Social Capital, Interhousehold Transfers and Economic Reform in Transition Economies: An Empirical Assessment" (with S. Johnson and L. Barberia), mimeo, 1999.

"Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance Based on a Survey of Public Officials" (with G. Mehrez and T. Gurgur), draft mimeo 2002.

VIII. Interdisciplinary Research

"Civil Liberties and Government Performance" (with J. Isham and L. Pritchett) *World Bank Economic Review*, May 1997. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/pritchet.pdf>

"A methodology to study incomes and expenditures among the urban poor" (with E. Velez) in *La Actualidad del Sector Informal Urbano en Colombia*, Universidad de los Andes, 1983.

"Female-headed households and the heterogeneity of urban marginality" (with E. Velez) in *Mujer y Familia en Colombia*, E. Bonilla, ed., 1985.

"Political Liberties, Political Order, and the Productivity of Investments" (with J. Isham), mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., September 1991.

"Interhousehold Transfers and Survival Strategies of Low Income Households: Experiences from Latin America, Asia and Africa" (with M. Bamberger, E. Velez and S. Parris), Draft Manuscript, July 1992.

"Governance and Project Performance: An Empirical Investigation" (with J. Isham and L. Pritchett) *Policy Research Working Paper No. 1550*, Policy Research Department, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1995.

"Listening to Stakeholders' Views about Their Development Challenges and World Bank Instruments", mimeo, Harvard Institute for International Development, January 1997.

"Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge", paper presented at a conference co-sponsored by the Ethical Globalization Initiative and the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University, New York City, March 1, 2004.

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/humanrights.pdf>

"Media, Governance and Development: An Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention," *Media Matters: Perspectives on Advancing Governance & Development from the Global Forum for Media Development*, October 2005.

IX. Public Education

"The Train-and-Disseminate Approach to Public Economic Education: and Application to Ukraine", mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1994.

"PET: A Participatory Program of Public Economic Education and Training", mimeo, The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1995.

"An Action-Learning Strategy in Governance", World Bank Institute: Washington, D.C., October 2001.

"A Learning Strategy for Anti-Money Laundering: addressing analytical and practical issues", The World Bank: Washington, D.C., November 2001.

Datasets related to these articles are available at:

<http://www.govindicators.org> and <http://resourcegovernanceindex.org/>

Access to academic publications also available at SSRN at:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=163813

State Capture in Transition

Submission to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State

Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann ¹

I. Preamble

1. We would like to begin our statement by commending this Commission for undertaking this comprehensive investigation of the phenomenon of state capture as it relates to South Africa. Though state capture is a significant challenge across both developed and developing countries, we know of no other country that has taken such a systematic approach to understanding the roots, forms and implications of state capture. We believe that this is a critical foundation for developing effective strategies to combat state capture. We look forward to the conclusions and recommendations of this Commission, which we hope will have resonance well beyond the South African context.
2. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that our statement will not comment upon the nature or extent of state capture in South Africa. Neither of us have studied nor experienced the phenomenon of state capture in the South African context. We acknowledge the work of many highly qualified South African authors, including individual scholars, prosecutors and public affairs institutes, who have expertly applied our conceptual framework to the complex realities of South Africa. We appear before the Commission as the authors of the initial analytical studies of state capture and observers of the phenomenon of state capture across many countries over nearly twenty years of research and policy engagement.

II. State Capture defined and described and the experience of transition economies.

3. Even if it realistically be exhaustively done in this written statement, our objectives are to:
 - i) define the very concept of state capture; ii) describe the context in which this concept was developed; iii) summarize various efforts to measure and analyze the extent and forms of state capture across countries of the world; iv) define the implications of state capture in the development trajectories of different countries, and, v) generally address some of the type of measures that countries can consider in combatting state capture.
4. While any strategy to combat state capture in South Africa should begin with a deep understanding of the concept and the experience of state capture around the world, the effectiveness of such strategies will depend on a careful analysis of the specific systemic characteristics of South Africa, which is not our area of expertise.

¹ Dean and Distinguished Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and President and CEO, Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI), respectively. We thank Jimena Montoya for excellent research assistance.

5. We first developed the concept of state capture² in the context of understanding the transition to market economies and democratic politics in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. At the time Joel Hellman was a senior political counsellor at the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and Daniel Kaufmann was a senior manager at the World Bank. Around that time a joint team of the World Bank and EBRD was working to design effective anti-corruption strategies as part of this transition and thus also engaged in understanding these issues.³
6. Though it was common at the time to compare countries by different *levels* of corruption, we observed that there were many different *forms* of corruption across the 27 countries that emerged from the former Soviet bloc. Moreover, we observed that these different forms of corruption appeared to have very different impacts on the pace and direction of the transition to market economies and democratic politics across the region. With these observations in mind, we sought to develop a new typology of corruption and to base this typology not just on theories of corruption, but on the actual measurement of different forms of corruption through extensive comparative survey research across the countries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
7. We identified two broad categories of corruption – administrative corruption and state capture. We defined administrative corruption as the attempts by individuals and firms to alter the *implementation* of laws, policies and regulations to their benefit through the provisions of illicit private gains to public officials. While some authors commonly referred to this form of corruption as “petty corruption,” we believed that such corruption was anything but “petty.” Administrative corruption could occur at any level of the political system – from paying police small sums to avoid traffic fines to paying politicians substantial bribes to exempt large firms from regulations.
8. In contrast, we defined state capture as the efforts of individuals or firms to shape the *formation* of laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials. The key distinction in this typology is not the size of the bribe nor the level in the political system where the bribery occurs, but rather whether the corruption is directed to distort the intended *implementation* of laws or to *shape* the formation of the laws themselves.

² Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. The World Bank. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=240555. Also published in 2003 at the Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December. Further, a synthesis article in: Hellman, J., & Kaufmann, D. (2001). Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies. Finance & Development, 38(3), 31-31. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm>. And on measurement of State Capture, also Hellman, Kaufmann et al, 2001, Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236214

³ Anderson, J., Hellman, J. S., et al. (2000). Anticorruption in transition: a contribution to the policy debate. World Bank Report No. 20925 Vol, 1. Also, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999) Transition report 1999: Ten Years of Transition.

9. In developing the concept of state capture, we drew upon an existing literature within economics on the concept of regulatory capture as defined half a century ago by the influential Nobel Prize-winning economist, George Stigler. Stigler defined “regulatory capture” as the idea that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” The concept of regulatory capture was limited to the formation of regulatory rules that directly affected industry. Like state capture, core to the concept of regulatory capture is the emphasis on the influence of particular firms or industries on the *formation* of regulations. Importantly, Stigler recognized that these particularistic benefits favoring identifiable firms or industries were likely to have an overall negative impact on the broader economy. As Stigler stated long ago, “When an industry receives a grant of power from the state, the benefit to the industry will fall short of the damage to the rest of the community”.⁴
10. Our conceptualization of state capture went beyond the definition of specific regulations and referred more broadly to a wider array of laws, policies and rules that shaped the very contours of the state. In our view, countries in the midst of simultaneous economic and political transitions, like the countries of the former Soviet bloc, were particularly vulnerable to state capture since they were in the process of both redistributing property rights and redrafting the basic rules of the game by which their markets, politics and societies were governed.
11. As a result, individuals and firms sought to provide illicit gains to public officials to ensure that property rights were defined to their advantage and that laws, policies and regulations impacting them were drafted to build in permanent economic and political preferences in the functioning of their economic and political systems. Such advantages could lock in long-term economic rents, in many cases of staggering proportions⁵, to individuals and firms capable of influencing those public officials who make laws, policies and regulations. And these advantages could impose substantial costs to competitors and, more significantly, negative externalities to the broader public by establishing an unlevelled playing field in the emerging market economy.
12. In the case of the former Soviet bloc, we observed that countries with a high degree of state capture tended to make more limited and more uneven progress in the transition from the command Soviet-type economy to a more competitive market economy.
13. In fact, Hellman argued that some of the post-communist transitions were stuck in what he called a “partial reform equilibrium” in which various distortions in the functioning of the market economy were built into the very nature of the post-communist state providing highly concentrated advantages to particular individuals and firms with close connections to state power while imposing high costs on the rest of the population in the form of inconsistent or incomplete market reforms.

⁴ Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell journal of economics and management science, 3-21.


⁵ The most prominent beneficiaries of state capture in the former Soviet countries became known colloquially as “oligarchs”, referring to their enormous wealth and political influence. See Hoffman, D. E. (2011). The oligarchs: Wealth and power in the new Russia. Hachette UK.

14. We went on to argue that state capture was a particularly pernicious form of corruption since it distorted the very nature of the state itself by manipulating the content of laws, policies and regulations to the advantage of particular individuals and firms at the expense of the common good. We also observed what appeared to be substantial variation in both the nature and extent of corruption in the 27 countries that emerged from the former Soviet bloc with significant implications for the progress in their transitions to market economies and democratic politics. This variation created opportunities to develop specific measures of such concepts as administrative corruption and state capture and compare the impacts of these problems on overall economic performance.
15. This led a joint effort by the World Bank and EBRD, which we led, to develop a cross-country survey instrument that attempted to measure state capture and other forms of corruption through analyzing the behavior of firms. The survey instrument – called the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (also known as BEEPS) – was administered across a representative sample of firms in each of the countries of the former Soviet bloc.⁶ Several rounds of the BEEPS survey were implemented across multiple years.

Figure 1

16. The survey asked firm managers if they had been directly and significantly affected by private payments made to public officials to influence decision making in one or more of the following: parliament, the executive apparatus, the criminal courts, the civil courts, the central bank, and political parties.⁷ The survey enabled us to categorize the extent of state capture across countries by comparing the share of firms in each country that claimed to be impacted by illicit attempts to influence laws, policies, rules and regulations. In addition, the survey identified firms that had used the provision of private benefits to public officials to influence laws, policies, rules or regulations to their benefit. We identified these as “captor firms.”

**‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’ Research on Capture, 1999-2000:
Differences in Transition Countries on the Extent of State Capture**




⁶ The findings and analysis reported here and in the cited papers were based on this specifically designed survey of nearly 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries, which was carried out in 1999 and comprised the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000).

⁷ Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann (2000).

17. On the basis of the survey, we could classify the countries of the former Soviet bloc into “high-capture” and “low-capture” countries. Using measurements that tracked the progress in transition to market economies and democratic politics defined by the EBRD (known as “transition indicators”), we were able to link it to our survey data on state capture and demonstrate that high-capture countries tended to show weaker progress in the extent and pace of their political and economic transitions. Although they made some strides in liberalization and privatization, they tended to be partial and these countries were much slower in enacting the complementary institutional reforms to support the emergence of markets. Their political regimes tended to be characterized by a greater concentration of power and limitations on political competition. These countries appeared to be stuck in a pattern of “partial reforms”.
18. In these high-capture countries, firms that engaged in state capture grew more than twice as fast as other firms, while in low-capture countries, these captor firms appeared to enjoy few advantages. Despite the specific benefits that captor firms enjoyed in high-capture economies, the overall enterprise sector in such economies grew at somewhat less than half the rate of firms in low-capture economies (figure 2). Capture therefore proved to be a strategy that generated substantial gains to specific powerful firms, while imposing an overall cost on all other firms in the economy.
19. In fact, we found that captor firms receive advantages in other areas as well, such as in terms of preferential access to some basic public goods, like for instance in the protection of property rights. The survey data showed that captor firms in high-capture economies were more than five times as likely as other firms to have seen improvements in the security of *their* property rights. Yet again, this came at a significant cost to the economy and to all other firms, since the overall level of insecurity of property rights was found to be much higher for the average firm (and even higher for non-captor firms) in high-capture economies than in low-capture economies.

Figure 2

Costs of State Capture – Private Sector grows and invests less




20. Our research also demonstrated that state capture systematically deterred private investment in the affected economies (figure 2) and created obstacles to the entry of small and medium-sized enterprises, undermining the key sources of sustainable growth. We argued that state capture tended to favor firms with connections over competence, and influence

over innovation⁸. Such firms used their influence to block any policies and laws that might eliminate distortions in economic and political processes that threatened their advantages. In other words, actors who enjoyed extraordinary gains from the distortions of a partially reformed economy fought to preserve those gains, through state capture, by maintaining the imbalances of partial reforms over time.⁹

Figure 3

21. We found that, at any given pace of economic reform, there is a dramatic decline in state capture in countries with higher levels of civil liberties (figure 3).¹⁰ In the capture economy, political influence was monopolized by powerful firms at different levels of government, with minimal checks and balances exerted by collective interests. We demonstrated that fostering competition in the economy and in the marketplace for political influence was a most effective way to prevent and combat state capture.¹¹



22. Our research also showed that post-communist countries with more frequent executive turnovers and shorter government tenures, i.e. greater political competition, achieved far greater progress in their economic transitions to a market economy.¹²

III. Expanding the analysis of State Capture

23. Subsequently a data and research effort was undertaken to cover the measurement of state capture in other countries around the world.¹³ This was done by an analysis of the data based on specific questions related to state capture integrated into the survey of firms in 104 countries in 2004 carried out by the World Economic Forum. The data analysis based on this information from firm executives indicated that state capture and corruption posed a serious challenge in many rich, emerging and developing countries, and also suggested that such corruption was negatively associated with a country's competitiveness.

⁸ Hellman, J., & Kaufmann, D. (2001). Confronting the challenge of state capture in transition economies. *Finance & Development*, 38(3), 31-31. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm>.

⁹ Hellman, J. S. (1998). Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions. *World politics*, 50(2), 203-234. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054036?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A04511259ead3bcd2f7a9540be271a527&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents.

¹⁰ Hellman & Kaufmann (2001).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Hellman (1998).

¹³ Kaufmann, D. (2004). Corruption, governance and security: Challenges for the rich countries and the world. WEF: Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. Available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan044780.pdf>

24. At that time, almost fifteen years ago, the data pointed to low levels of capture in the Scandinavian countries, among a few others, sharply contrasting many other countries, including the United States, Brazil as well as other countries in South America, some countries in Africa, and many in the Former Soviet Union. The analysis of the data also highlighted the generally wide gap among OECD countries between traditional forms of corruption, such as administrative bribery, which was relatively low, and their extent of state capture (including its quasi-legal forms), whose prevalence was high.

IV. Implications of State Capture Research

25. After nearly twenty years of research on the concept of state capture, rooted first in the post-Soviet transition economies and then expanded to other regions across the world, we would argue that our analysis suggests a broader rethinking of the traditional understanding of corruption more broadly. For generations, the traditional definition of corruption has focused on abuse of public office for private gain. Yet in identifying and analyzing the phenomenon of state capture, we recognized that:

- i) the balance of power in corrupt transactions often did not fully reside with the public official (extorting the private agent); instead often the private actor (the captor) wielded more power than the public official and even politicians;
- ii) within the public sphere, high level politicians as those responsible for drafting and approving laws, policies, and regulations wielded more power and responsibility for the abuses than public officials or bureaucrats as implementors of those laws, policies, and regulations;
- iii) sophisticated forms of undue influence and high level corruption were not always necessarily illegal in a strict formal sense, according to the existing laws at the time in the country, and,
- iv) manifestations of high level corruption other than administrative bribery -- such as the shaping of the rules of the game (policies, laws and regulations) by the elite, were highly prevalent and far more costly.

26. Hence, the concept of state capture went beyond traditional definitions of corruption to account more broadly for the undue benefits derived by the private few from their excessive influence in shaping the institutions, policies, laws and regulations of the state to their own ends. Our aim was not to fully replace the conventional definition of corruption¹⁴, but to add new facets to our understanding of different forms of corruption whose impact appeared to have greater economic costs and political consequences for the trajectory of affected countries. It is no surprise therefore that --beyond the growing body of work by academics--, the notion of state capture is increasingly becoming part of the lexicon in prominent organizations (including Transparency International and the International Monetary Fund), as well as in some countries.

27. An important contribution of the concept of state capture has been to place the private sector as central as the public sector in defining forms of corruption. In this context, the case was also made that the form of corruption that we had identified as state capture can often be legal,

¹⁴ Kaufmann (2004).

according to the laws of the land prevailing at a point in time.¹⁵ In particular, where the “rules of the game” have been captured by the elite, manifestations of so-called “legal corruption”, including undue influence, may in many instances be more prevalent than strictly illegal forms, such as outright bribery. Legality is often determined at the political level; therefore, it is a decision variable of the elite in power protecting their interests (e.g. lobbying, campaign finance; financial sector regulation). The emergence of a corruption-prone legal framework is therefore related to the dynamics of state capture, and it has implications for types of reforms, in that what has been considered legal at a particular moment in time, may subsequently need to become illegal.

V. What can be done to address state capture?

28. In order to address state capture, it is critical to have an in-depth diagnostic of the specific circumstances of each affected country, one which considers its own unique socio-political and institutional context. Further, the detailed nature of corruption and state capture, whose causes and manifestations vary from one setting to another, needs to be studied and understood so to elaborate country-relevant action programs. There is no simple, “boiler-plate” template that can be applied to all countries.
29. To develop an action program, country-specific expertise is essential, even as some general empirical diagnostic approaches and tools can assist in this process. Further, general lessons of experience globally may also be useful in pointing to an array of potential reforms and initiatives that can have an impact. Here we suggest some potential factors and initiatives, drawing from global experience, mindful that identifying the priority measures that may warrant adoption in a particular country will vary from one setting to another. In other words, here we cannot offer a definitive ‘roadmap’ to address state capture for any given country.
30. While not exhaustive, the range of potential reform areas is substantial, even though they generally fall into a few broad reform categories – political and economic contestability; political finance; conflict of interest; procurement; sector-specific initiatives, as well as transparency reforms generally.
31. As will be clear from the categories and recommended actions outlined below, we explicitly focus on institutional and policy reforms that are aimed at reducing the risk of state capture. We treat state capture as a product of institutional deficiencies –and as a systemic failure of governance–, not as a criminal issue. As such, we do not make recommendations regarding investigation or prosecution of state capture after the fact. These are issues that are highly contingent on the specific legal and judicial systems of individual countries. Thus, even though some legal and judiciary initiatives and reforms (including those that can be preventive and not necessarily punitive) may also need to feature as a component in a strategy to address state capture, we do not cover these here.

¹⁵ Kaufmann, D., and Vicente, P. C. (2011). “Legal corruption”. *Economics & Politics*, 23(2), 195-219.

32. Indeed, the focus of the types of reform recommendations listed below is preventive, not punitive. Often these preventive measures are undertaken in conjunction with investigations and prosecutions of illicit activities as a demonstration effect of a country's commitment to root out corruption. But we emphasize that prosecutions in the absence of significant institutional reforms to tackle the vulnerability of political and economic systems to state capture have not been seen as successful in international experience.

V.1. Political and Economic Contestability

33. As suggested in our section on our work in economies in transition, a key finding we had from the data analysis regarding possible determinants of state capture pointed to insufficient political and economic contestability (see Figure 3 above). A corollary from such research on transition economies was that an important antidote to state capture was to ensure a competitive polity and economy. Thus, for post-Soviet economies we emphasized the importance of fostering competition in the economy to reduce the concentrated market power of individual firms as well as having an open multi-party system to create a truly competitive marketplace for political influence.
34. Encouraging a level playing field –where medium and small-scale enterprises can thrive--is therefore important to mitigate state capture, as is having political and civil liberties safeguarded. Countries that successfully turned to more competitive markets and polity such as new members of the European Union, like the Baltic countries, Slovenia, and Slovakia, performed better than their counterparts, such as Ukraine and Russia.
35. While political and economic contestability is likely to be a necessary condition for mitigating state capture in economies in transition and others, these would need to be further detailed and fleshed out in each particular country context. Further, while these priority reforms may prove to be necessary for progress, they are unlikely to suffice on their own. Other important aspects of governance-related reforms would need to be considered as well. And the experience from other countries, and regions, including in Latin America, provides insights as well. The reform themes, and possible measures within each, which are showcased below, are indicative.

V.2. Political finance

36. Both legal and illegal private interests can infiltrate political bodies through campaign contributions and other forms of political financing. In Latin America, not only infrastructure companies have been important contributors with some intending to “privatize” the public decision-making process, but also in some countries drug traffickers and organized crime have used this mechanism to buy impunity.¹⁶ The political finance mechanism for enabling state

¹⁶ Casas-Zamora, K., and Zovato, D. (2015). The Cost of Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulation in Latin America. Policy brief, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Institution. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Cost-of-Democracy-CasasZamora-Zovatto.pdf>.

capture is also prevalent at the subnational level, where often there is large concentration of economic power and less competitive political arenas.¹⁷

37. As a response, there should be measures that promote electoral competition, improved regulation and transparency of political finance. Some practices which have been effective in combatting state capture include:

- Public funding and subsidy systems that promote competition by enabling small parties and candidates that have no close ties to business, as well as controlling use of funds and resources by incumbents during campaigns.
- Control of public finance should include bans on anonymous contributions and financing from foreign sources and limits on contributions from legal entities.¹⁸
- Restrictions on spending, especially in high-profile and costly areas, such as campaign advertising.
- The public subsidy system for campaigns and spending limits should be designed to avoid favoring incumbents and, overall, their legislation should reflect citizens' political preferences.
- Rules of transparency are necessary for the success of other campaign finance regulations. Transparency is suggested for all contributions to and from all relevant actors, including candidates, corporations, political foundations, NGOs and associations linked with candidates or parties.

V.3. Public procurement

38. Procurement is often a focus for state capture as public procurement can be a major source of economic rents for firms closely tied to politicians and political parties. Using state capture to shape the procurement playing field to the benefits of specific firms is perhaps one of the most common forms of state capture. As a result, procurement reform is generally an important starting point in the effort to combat state capture. A procurement process that enhances competition in new investments and renegotiations, contract transparency, and protecting whistleblowers are key for all infrastructure contracts in energy, transportation, extractives and related sectors.

39. Among the reforms to enhance such competition in procurement are:

- A separation of powers and responsibilities between infrastructure planning bodies and the units in charge of contract compliance to break conflicts of interest between promoting new investment and enforcing existing contracts.¹⁹

¹⁷ OECD (2016), *Financing Democracy: Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264249455-en>

¹⁸ Expert Advisory Group's Report (EAG) (2018). *Corruption, Transparency, and Integrity in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

¹⁹ EAG Report (2018).

- The use of independent technical review panels should be promoted to mediate conflicts and review any contract renegotiations.²⁰
- Provide incentives and protection for whistleblowers to come forward with information on corrupt deals in infrastructure.²¹
- Avoid “financial equilibrium clauses” in public-private partnership legislation and contracts,²²
- Investments from public-private partnerships should become part of the government’s budgets, balance sheet, and normal oversight processes.

V.4. State-owned enterprise reform

40. State-owned enterprises can be used to cement the ties between politicians and private actors. As such, they are often critical transmission mechanisms through which state capture occurs. Though traditionally, state-owned enterprises are often seen as potential vehicles for fostering the state’s interests, there are also risks that powerful state-owned firms use their close relationships to state actors to shape laws, policies and regulations in their own interest. Moreover, the murky boundaries between ownership and control rights in state-owned enterprises can give leeway to managers to manipulate their ties to the state for their own interests.
41. As a result, to prevent state capture emanating from state-owned enterprises, there needs to be a clear separation of the management of state-owned companies and politics, and this particularly important in key sectors such as energy, extractives and finance. Government’s nominations of professional management should be subject to independent high level commissions driven by meritocratic and professional objectives, and also considered by the parliament to ensure its independence from external pressure.²³
42. While exhaustive recommendations to address capture in SOEs is not our objective here, related measures to illustrate the need for reforms include the empowerment of professional, independent boards, which should also be selected through a meritocratic process, emphasizing technical expertise over political patronage. Further, ensuring transparency and oversight by disclose revenues, costs, revenue flow between SOEs and the state, disclosing data on production, plans, trading activities as well as quasi-fiscal activities. Independent financial audits and an effective level of legislative oversight are also very important.²⁴

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ EAG Report (2018) and OECD (2016). The latter emphasizes that these measures can build ethics and bring value to the organizational culture both in the private and public sector. Moreover, whistleblowing is not only a way to declare wrongdoing, but can also have a deterrent effect on it.

²² Ibid. These clauses have been a major reason for opportunistic renegotiations, with high efficiency costs. such clauses mandate that any judicial, administrative or legal action by government that affects the firm’s income must be compensated.

²³ Heller, P. R., Mahdavi, P., & Schreuder, J. (2014). Reforming national oil companies: Nine recommendations. Natural Resource Governance Institute. Available at

https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_9recs_eng_v3.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid.

V.5. Sectoral Reforms

43. As mentioned, we are keenly aware of the need to tailor reforms to each country context. Similarly, reforms need to be designed and implemented with regards to the particularities of each key sector subject to capture. In fact, at a national level, the determinants, manifestations and implications of state capture will be rather different in a country whose mainstay is, say, the financial sector, versus an oil-rich country. State capture is highly likely, and costly, in either, yet the particularities will vary, which matters for reform design and implementation.
44. Further, the very different political, regulatory, technical and economic characteristics of each key sector does warrant a sector-specific approach, complementing the over-arching national (and subnational) level reforms to address capture. The approach and particularities to address state capture in the financial sector, for instance – where lessons can be drawn from United States, among others –, will be very different than for the oil or mining sector.
45. As an illustration, consider reforms of State Enterprises, just discussed above. Reforming SOEs in the extractives sector (oil or mining) requires specialized diagnosis taking into account the political, regulatory, and technical nature of SOEs in that sector. The types of reforms regarding the SOEs in this sector – regarding transparency, their remit, oversight, commercialization, and corporate governance will have particular characteristics derived from the sectoral specifics.²⁵
46. Another area of reform, addressed in brief next, is transparency. The types of priority measures required for transparency in the financial sector is rather different than the very sector-specific type of transparency reforms (revenue flows, contracts, beneficiary owners, commodity trades, environmental assessments, etc) that is part of the best practice norms in natural resources. In the context of such sectoral transparency reforms in extractives, for instance, countries can benefit from joining the global initiative supporting best practices in this area, namely the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which currently includes over 50 member countries.²⁶

V.6. Conflict of interest

47. At root, state capture is a manifestation of a conflict of interest. Private individuals or firms seek to engage politicians and public sector actors through the provision of private benefits to shape public decisions in their interests. As a result, robust legislation to regulate conflicts of interest and the interaction between public officials and private actors is critical to prevent state capture. In addition, a strong monitoring system to police conflicts of interest is critical to make such legislation effective. Conflict of interest legislation is still in its infancy in many countries around the world. Where such legislation does exist, enforcement mechanisms are generally quite weak.

²⁵ As a general illustration of these issues, see Kaufmann, D., Heller, P., and Gillies, A. (2018) “What makes an accountable state-owned enterprise?” Brookings Institution

²⁶ Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), at <https://eiti.org/>

48. Some measures to consider to address conflicts of interest include:

- Establishing and implementing clear cooling off periods, full disclosure of financial assets and conflicts of interests, and recusal mechanisms for countering revolving doors.²⁷
- Technology also provides valuable tools in the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of corrupt practices.
- The private sector can play its part by strengthening its corporate compliance systems to address existing and evolving challenges.
- Ensure citizen input is received and acted upon quickly, feeds the system with feedback, inter alia by protecting civic space.

V.7. Transparency

49. As the popular expression goes, “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. Beyond conflict of interest legislation, practices that promote greater transparency at the intersection of state and private sector interests are critical to preventing state capture. Effective disclosures are key for monitoring and accountability, and can be particularly effective where civil society and the media are able to operate without undue constraints.

50. Such practices could include:²⁸

- Essential information for any industry is obtained through proactively establishing and publishing a registry of ultimate beneficial ownership of all corporate entities and similar legal vehicles, adopting effective sanctions for untruthful registration.
- Disclosure of and public access to the financial dealings of politicians and other officials, and preventive legal rules that require officials either to divest themselves and their families of certain financial interests or to recuse themselves from taking part in the decision-making process where they have a conflict.
- An independent body to enforce disclosure and recusal requirements in a way that can force the resignation or reassignment of offending officials and review challenges to the rules.
- Particularly in the banking sector, a critical gate-keeper of legitimate business transactions, adhere not only to state of the art regulations in prevention of money laundering, but also to the highest standards in ethical practices, including transparent financial information.

²⁷ EAG report.

²⁸ As in previous subsection, largely drawn from the cited EAG 2018 report, of which D. Kaufmann is an author.

VI. Concluding

51. We began by commending the Commission on its ambition to take a systematic approach to the problem of state capture. Throughout our statement, we have emphasized that state capture is a major systemic challenge, closely linked to institutional and governance deficiencies and failures.
52. There are always corrupt individuals on both sides of the state capture relationship. Yet the problem itself is rooted in institutional flaws that concentrate economic and political power, that enable those with such economic power to unduly influence political decision-making, that reduce competitive pressures from countervailing actors, that restrict voice and accountability to citizens, and thus that enable powerful actors to shape laws, policies and regulations for their own benefit. And this takes place at the expense of the common good, of the well-being of the common citizen, and of the small and medium scale entrepreneurs.
53. The risks of state capture are rather evident in countries in transition –as well as others with fragile institutions--, where the very rules of the game shaping the market economy and the political system are in flux. This creates major opportunities for state capture, since the incentives for powerful economic actors to shape the new rules of the game to their own benefit are strong. The potential gains are enormous, and the checks and balances to counter such capture are often weak.
54. Equally significant are the costs imposed on the greater good for the public at large in terms of misallocated resources, unfair competitive practices, unequal distributions of rights, benefits, and incomes, and the perpetuation of an unequal level political and economic playing field. Such outcomes can spur broad popular resentment and disillusionment. Yet with political resolve and determination by the key stakeholders, enabling the adoption and implementation of governance reforms, countries can mitigate the risk of state capture and its direst consequences. And even if it is far from simple, countries already experiencing state capture can also make inroads over time in addressing it.

Signed on August 29, 2018:

Daniel Kaufmann

Daniel Kaufmann

Joel Hellman

Joel Hellman